Trade Regulation—Lanham Trade-Mark Act—Right to Registration for Bottle Configuration on Principal Register During Life of Design Patent.--Application of Mogen David Wine Corp by Dohoney, James P
Boston College Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 24
1-1-1965
Trade Regulation—Lanham Trade-Mark
Act—Right to Registration for Bottle
Configuration on Principal Register During Life of
Design Patent.--Application of Mogen David Wine
Corp
James P. Dohoney
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James P. Dohoney, Trade Regulation—Lanham Trade-Mark Act—Right to Registration for Bottle
Configuration on Principal Register During Life of Design Patent.--Application of Mogen David Wine
Corp, 6 B.C.L. Rev. 380 (1965), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol6/iss2/24
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
mission agreements were not necessarily illegal unless they constituted un-
fair competition." In each case, then, the unfairness must be shown.
The Texaco view is more in accord with the traditional curbs placed on
the injunctive power of the FTC. The order should not be any broader than
is necessary to prohibit similar illegal acts in the future," nor should its
enforcement forbid methods of competition that do not unfairly restrain
trade.28
 Rather, it should be effective at the level at which the restraint
takes place. As Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in International Salt Co.
v. United States,29
 said concerning the rule of FTC v. Royal Milling Co."
and Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 31
[T]he law .. . respeCts the wisdom of not burning even part of a
house in order to roast a pig.... The Government is not entitled to
a provision in the decree which can be justified only on some
indication . . . that appellant's past shows a devious temper which
needs to be hobbled by withdrawing a conceded legal right. 82
The Commission, in fact, in two recent cases," agreed to consent orders
which ordered a franchisor to cease coercing his dealers to carry a sponsored
product but did not outlaw the franchisor's sales commission plan.
In conclusion, the Texaco court refuses to use economic power to
prospectively prohibit all future sales commission agreements between the
TBA supplier and any gasoline company, as the Goodyear court did. These
restraints placed by Texaco on the prohibitive scope of the FTC's decrees
are more in agreement with the traditional views of that agency's powers.
The Goodyear decision, in so far as it restrains Goodyear from any further
competition for sales commission agreements, may be a more serious restraint
of trade than the sales commission system it was intended to eliminate.
GEORGE M. DOHERTY
Trade Regulation—Lanham Trade-Mark Act—Right to Registration
for Bottle Configuration on Principal Register During Life of Design
Patent.—Application of Mogen David Wine Corp.1—Mogen David Wine
Corporation was the holder of a design patent on a bottle configuration and
applied for trademark registration of the configuration on the principal
26 Ibid.
27 See FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933) ; Swanee Paper Corp. v.
FTC, 291 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Virginia Excelsior Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 256 F.2d 538
(4th Cir. 1958).
28 FTC v. Cement Institute, supra note 10, at 727.
29 Supra note 4.
38 Supra note 27.
81 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
82 International Salt Co. v. United States, supra note 4, at 403, 405.
33 O.K. Rubber Welders, Inc. and the B. .F. Goodrich Co., 1964 FTC Complaints,
Orders, Stipulations Q 16953 (July 3, 1964) at 22014; Kaiser Jeep Corp., 1964 FTC
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations 11 16891 (April 27, 1964) at 21927.
1 51 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 4, 328 F.2d 925 (1964).
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register. For a period of some thirty years Mogen David had sold large
quantities of wine in decanters identical or closely similar to the configu-
ration for which registration was sought and had advertised its wine in such
decanter bottles on television, on billboards, in magazines, and through
other media. Affidavits from retailers and dealers were presented to the effect
that these dealers were familiar with various wines, and that they associated
wines sold in this decanter only with the Mogen David Corporation. The
examiner refused registration on the factual ground that the container did
not function as a trademark. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
sustained the refusal of registration, concluding that issuance of the regis-
tration would be prejudicial to the interests of others who would have the
right to make use of the patented design at the expiration of the patent. 3
The Board declared registration permissible on the supplemental register
but precluded registration as a matter of law on the principal register during
the life of the design patent. Mogen David appealed this ruling to the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals. HELD: Applicant is not precluded from
obtaining registration on the principal register during the life of the design
patent. The case was remanded to the Board for a determination of whether
the evidence sustained the contention that applicant's bottle design did in
fact function as a trademark.
The court based its decision on the fundamental distinction between
trademark and patent protection. The purpose of a design patent is to grant
the exclusive use of a decorative, non-functional design to the owner of the
patent; while the purpose of trademark protection is to protect property
rights of the applicant in non-functional, decorative features which indicate
origin of the goods in the applicant. The court also cited prior cases that
gave common law trademark protection on the basis of unfair competition
where the plaintiff held a design patent. 3 The court finally pointed out that
if Mogen David had secured trademark protection first, it would have had no
difficulty in subsequently obtaining a design patent.
Whether the court would allow principal registration for the subject of
a design patent was a matter of some speculation. An examination of the
case law in the area, however, will reveal that there has been a general trend
favoring the granting of such registration. One of the earliest and most
important cases in the field is Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. 4 This case
involved the use by the defendant of certain sewing machine parts and
insignia that had originally been used and patented by Singer. The court
ruled that on expiration of the patent the public had a right to manufacture
the article in the same form in which it was made under the patent. This
ruling has been reaffirmed often.3 Moreover, it has been the basis of a
2 Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 134 U.S.P.Q. 576 (T.T.A.B. 1963).
3
 Lucien Lelong, Inc. v. George W. Button Corp., 50 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1943);
Prince Matchabelli Inc. v. Anhalt & Co., 40 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Oneida,
Ltd. v. National Silver Co., 25 N.Y.S.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. 1940)„
4
 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
5
 Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Allen v. Walton
Wood & Metal Co., 178 Fed. 287 (N.D.N.Y. 1910). See 1 Nims, The Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-marks § 139 (4th ed. 1947).
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strong intimation that the subject of a design patent could not be registered
as a trademark .6 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson 7 involved an
application for trademark registration of certain diamond-shaped blocks
imprinted on tires and packages. Registration was denied principally on
other grounds; but the court noted that plaintiff was the owner of two design
patents, and said, "nor . . . can a trademark be used to perform the function
of a design patent." 8 This implied that the plaintiff would not be able to
use a trademark to perpetuate any rights he held under the design patent.
An important restriction, however, on the right of duplication is found in
Centaur Co. v. Neathery.° There the plaintiff was the manufacturer of a
children's laxative and had used a distinct wrapper for twenty years. De-
fendant began to use labels that closely approximated those of the plaintiff.
The court held that even though the manufacture of the product is free to
the public at the expiration of the patent, the defendant could not package
his goods in such a way as to deceive a purchaser into thinking he was
buying the plaintiff's product. Thus, even without trademark regulation,
there is some protection afforded a manufacturer who has identified his
goods in a distinctive manner. Additional protection in the form of trade-
mark protection was given in Ex parte Caron Corp.," where registration
on the supplemental register was granted to the subject of an expired design
patent. The trend towards greater protection was brought one step further
by In re Pepsi-Cola." In this case the plaintiff was the holder of an existing
design patent and was able to gain a supplemental registration. This case
differs from Mogen David only in regard to the type of registration. For
the point at issue, the most important difference between the two registers
is that registration on the principal register affords the applicant the right
to exclusive use of the specified design,12 while the supplemental register
6
 Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945); Walworth Co. v.
Moore Drop Forging Co., 19 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1927); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Robertson, 18 F.2d 639 (D. Md. 1927), aff'd, 25 F.2d 833 (4th Cir. 1928); Ex parte
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q. 74 (Corn. Pats. 1952).
7
 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Robertson, supra note 6.
8
 Id. at 641.
0 91 Fed. 891 (5th Cir. 1898).
10
 100 U.S.P.Q. 356 (Corn. Pats. 1954).
11 120 U.S.P.Q. 468 (T.T.A.B. 1959).
12
 60 Stat. 436 (1946), 15 U.S.C. 4 1094 (195 8):
The provisions of this chapter shall govern so far as applicable applications
for registration and registrations on the supplemental register as well as those
on the principal register, but applications for and registrations on the supple-
mental register shall not be subject to or receive the advantages of sections .. .
1057(b) . . . of this title.
64 Stat. 459 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (1958):
A certificate of registration of a mark upon the principal register provided
by this chapter shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration,
registrant's ownership of the mark, and of registrant's exclusive right to use
the mark in commerce in connection with the goods or services specified in the
certificate, subject to any conditions and limitations stated therein.
See Elcon Mfg. Co. v. Elcon Mfg. Co., 132 F. Supp. 769 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
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serves primarily to form a basis for foreign registration." Thus the next
logical step was taken in the Mogen David case, when the court granted
principal registration for the subject of an existing design patent. The ex-
amination below leads to the conclusion that this is the correct result.
An analysis of the pertinent statute indicates that registration should not
be denied because of an already existing design patent. The statute states:
(f) Except as expressly excluded in paragraphs (a)-(d) of this
section, nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a
mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of ap-
plicant's goods in commerce."
Paragraphs (a)-(d) are concerned principally with such objections as im-
morality of the subject matter, connection with persons living or dead,
similarity to governmental insignia, and previous trademarks." These
paragraphs in no way exclude an article from registration because it is
already the subject of a design patent. Moreover, by so specifying the objec-
tions to the granting of registration, it is submitted that Congress intended
this to be a complete list of objections and therefore did not intend that
the existence of a design patent should preclude registration.
The strongest objection to principal registration is that it would have the
effect of "extending" the patent monopoly and thus violate the right of the
public to use the patented article." However, a careful analysis will show
that the patent monopoly is not extended since the rights of patent protection
are distinct from those of trademark protection and are guaranteed by dif-
ferent laws. Patent laws, in general, prevent a party from making, using, or
selling any patented invention. 17
 Moreover, in relation to a design patent,
13
 Martens, Trademark Registration of Patented Articles—Extension of Monopoly?,
7 Patent, Trade-mark, and Copyright J. of Research & Education 474 (1963).
14
 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1958).
15
 60 Stat. 428 (1946), 15 U.S.C. 1 1052 (1958):
No trade-mark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished
from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register
on account of its nature unless it—
(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter;
or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons,
living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into
comtempt, or disrepute.
(b) Consists of or comprises the flag or coat of arms or other insignia of
the United States, or of any State or municipality, or of any foreign nation,
or any simulation thereof.
(c) Consists of or comprises a name, portrait, or signature identifying a
particular living individual except by his written consent, or the name, sig-
nature, or portrait of a deceased President of the United States during the life
of his widow, if any, except by the written consent of the widow.
76 Stat. 769 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (Supp. V, 1963):
(d) Consists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark registered
in the Patent Office or a mark or trade name previously used in the United
States by another and not abandoned, as to be likely, when applied to the goods
of the applicant, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.. • .
16 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., supra note 4.
17 35 U.S.C.
	 271 (a) (1958) '(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
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additional protection is granted . in that no one may apply the patented
design or an imitation of it to any article of manufacture in order to sell the
article, nor can anyone sell an article to which the design has been applied.' 8
On the other hand, trademark rights are governed by a different statute which
provides that no one may use in commerce any reproduction or imitation of
the registered mark in connection with the sale of any goods or services
which would be likely to cause confusion with the goods or services of the
registrant.'° These statutes operate independently, and contain no indication
that Congress intended one to displace the other in areas to which both
can apply.
The rights which Congress purports to protect under the patent and
trademark statutes are separate and distinct. 20
 Patent laws were passed to
encourage inventiveness and stimulate technological advances by providing
the reward of exclusive use under the patent?' They grant an effective
monopoly to the inventors by preventing the copying of the article itself, 22
regardless of how it is labelled. Trademark laws, on the other hand, are not
concerned with the copying of the article itself as long as the label or
package of the article will not deceive or confuse the public as to its origin. 23
Once a manufacturer has connected his product with a distinctive mark or
package in the Minds of consumers, registration of his trademark prohibits
others from palming off their own products under his mark or package 24
makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during
the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.
10
 35 U.S.C. § 289 (1958):
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design without license of the
owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to
any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for
sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has
been applied shall be liable. . . .
111
 76 Stat. 773 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. V, 1963):
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—.
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements
intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable. . . .
20
 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1958) ; 35 U.S.C. 	 289 (1958) ; 76 Stat. 773 (1952), 15
U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. V, 1963). These statutes are set out above in notes 17, 18, and 19.
21 See Ex parte Caron Corp., supra note 10.
22 See Wehringer, Two For One: Trademark and Design Patents, 50 Trademark
Rep. 1158 (1960).
28
 Ibid.
24 76 Stat. 773 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. V;•1963). This statute is set out
above in note 19.
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They may duplicate the unpatented product, but they may not use the
registered trademark to deceive the public as to who manufactured it."
In the case of a design, such as the shape of a wine bottle, these distinct
rights are apt to be confused. A design patent prevents copying the shape of
the bottle because of its inventiveness." Trademark registration prevents
the same type of copying27 but for the unrelated purpose of preventing con-
fusion as to origin." The rights and purposes are distinct," but, coinciden-
tally, the restrictions on copying are effectively the same. It is this coincidence
that has led courts in earlier cases to consider trademark protection an
extension of patent protection. 30 This viewpoint is erroneous, however,
since each of the two rights is valid and independent of the other. Each
deserves the protection that Congress intended to afford it.
Some concern has been voiced that the decision in this case might not
stand in view of two recent decisions of the Supreme Court." These decisions
are Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiliel Co., 32 and Cornpco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc.8 3 Since the cases are strikingly similar, they will be considered
together. In both cases the plaintiff held a design patent on certain fixtures
—a pole lamp in Sears and a lighting fixture in Compco. The defendants
produced closely similar products. In actions for patent infringement and
unfair competition, the district court in both cases held the patents in-
valid but found the defendants guilty of unfair competition. The Court
of Appeals affirmed." The Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that
federal laws on patents have occupied the field, and that a state cannot
make a law that clashes with the federal patent policy of allowing the public
to copy freely any unpatented article." In the Compco case, the Court went
so far as to say that even though the article had acquired a secondary
meaning, "if the design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal
statutory protection, then it can be copied at will." 36 It is submitted that
the Sears and Compco cases will not affect the present holding. The Court
in those cases was primarily concerned with a problem of federalism. Federal
law must take precedence over state law in this area. This problem, however,
is not present in the instant case since the trademark registration that is
25 See William H. Keller, Inc. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 298 Fed. 52 (7th
Cir. 1923), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 593 (1924).
26 See Ex parte Caron Corp., supra note 10.
27 76 Stat. 773 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Supp. V, 1963). This statute is set out
above in note 19.
28 See Ex parte Caron Corp., supra note 10.
99 Ibid.
80 E.g., Walworth Co. v. Moore Drop Forging Co,, supra note 6; Ex parte Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., supra note 6.
81 Derenberg, The Seventeenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, Vol. 142, No. 6 Patent, Trademark, & Copyright Weekly Reports 3 (1964).
82 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
33 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
34 Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963) ; Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1963).
85 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiff el Co., supra note 32; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., supra note 33.
se Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., supra note 33, at 238.
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sought is merely another form of federal protection. Also, it is submitted
that the Court in the Sears and Cornpco cases did not intend to assert that
trademark protection was contrary to federal patent policy. In the Compco
case the Court said that if the design were not entitled to "other federal
statutory protection," 37 it could be copied. This implies that federal trade-
mark protection would be permissible and would validly prevent the copying
of the article.
In conclusion, this case is the culmination of a prevailing trend toward
extending trademark protection. The result reached here is in perfect
conformity with the relevant statutes and is based on a critical distinction
between patent and trademark protection. Moreover, rehearing for this case
has been denied,88
 and therefore this holding will undoubtedly be the
continuing view.
JAm_Es P. DOHONEY
87 Ibid.
88
 Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., — C.C.P.A. (Patents) —,
	 F.2d —
(1964).
•
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